Summary
Tests selective jamming of Bluetooth periodic advertising and proposes a defence, using development boards and simulations rather than finished Auracast hearing devices.
Key findings
- The paper identifies plaintext timing and channel information in periodic advertising as enabling selective interference with synchronization packets. It studies a shared mechanism used by Auracast, rather than end-to-end listening.
- Section V uses nRF52840 boards with one broadcaster, one jammer and seven scanners. Five runs each contain 10,000 periodic-advertising events.
- Without the proposed defence, the seven scanners averaged 91.36% packet reception without jamming; under the tested attack every scanner fell below 5%. With SPADE, reception under attack exceeded 80% at every scanner. These are packet reception ratios, not speech scores.
- SPADE distributes device-specific timing and channel information through brief connections and uses receiver feedback to identify and exclude an attacker. Section IV notes that it reacts after an attack begins and that an attacker can seek readmission with another identity.
Limits
A laboratory periodic-advertising experiment plus simulations, with no listeners, commercial hearing-aid sample or occupied venue trial. The proposed changes require implementation support and are not evidence of a protection already available in venue products. Year from the proceedings line and copyright; DOI 10.1109/DCOSS-IoT58021.2023.00015.
Read the original
nsl.cau.ac.kr/~jpaek/docs/spade-dcoss-iot-2023.pdf
Cited in
Cite this source
Ryoo D, Yoo Y, Paek J, Bahk S. SPADE: Secure Periodic Advertising using Coded Time-Channel Rendezvous for BLE Audio. IEEE DCOSS-IoT 2023. 2023. https://nsl.cau.ac.kr/~jpaek/docs/spade-dcoss-iot-2023.pdf (accessed 13 October 2026).
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